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After some time spent studying the formidable obstacles to inter-
national macroeconomic policy coordination, I have begun to think
about the more constructive question of defining the necessary charac-
teristics of a coordination plan best suited to overcoming these obstacles.
If international coordination agreements are to be substantive, they must
comprise packages of policy changes that each country would not
necessarily be willing to make on its own, but that each believes will be
beneficial when enacted jointly. If coordination agreements are to be
enforceable, the individual authorities must commit to specific "perfor-
mance criteria," and these criteria must be closely enough related to the
policy instruments they control directly that they can be held loosely
accountable for deviations. On the other hand, if coordination agree-
ments are to be successful at raising economic welfare, the specific criteria
that the authorities have committed to must be closely enough related to
their ultimate goals--such as output and inflation--that the desirability
of having achieved those criteria is not negated by velocity shifts and the
other large uncertainties that plague economic relationships.
The current G-7 system of indicators, originally formulated at the
Tokyo Economic Summit in May 1986 and supposedly refined at
subsequent meetings, lacks some of the characteristics needed to pro-
duce substantive, enforceable, successful coordination agreements. I
mean this judgment to go far beyond the simple point that the member
countries are not yet politically ready to give up the amount of
sovereignty needed for full-scale joint optimization. It goes without
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saying that the day of such a degree of political consensus lies far off in
the future, if indeed it ever comes. The most we can hope for is to begin
in the early 1990s a system in which countries agree to give up just a
small amount of sovereignty, hoping to get in return a small joint gain.
Then, if coordination is successful on this small scale, the demonstrated
record of compliance by the members, and the demonstrated benefits,
may engender enough trust in the system to support a greater degree of
commitment in subsequent stages if it is desired.
The first reason why the present G-7 indicator system is not as
well-suited as it might be to such a plan is that the group does not
announce the numbers agreed upon, if indeed it in fact bargains over
specific targets for its list of indicators at all.1 The second reason is that,
even if the G-7 were to progress to the point of negotiating and
announcing the indicators, there are too many indicators on the list to
constitute any serious constraint on policymaking by national authori-
ties. Given that each country has only two or so policy instruments at its
disposal--monetary policy and fiscal policy--some indicators will al-
ways be moving in such a way as to justify whatever policy settings the
country wants. The third reason is that, even if the G-7 continues to
winnow down the list of 10 indicators mentioned in the Tokyo Summit
(11, if one includes former Treasury Secretary Baker’s 1987 suggestion of
adding the price of gold and other commodities to the list) to just one
indicator, none of them is a good candidate to be that one. All are either
too far removed from the policy instruments that authorities have under
their direct control and can therefore be held accountable for, or are too
far removed from the output and inflation target variables that ulti-
mately matter.
I would like to offer the modest proposal that the G-7 in their future
negotiations focus on setting for each member a single target variable:
the rate of growth of nominal GNP, or better yet, nominal demand. At
the risk of over-glorifying what is a fairly simple and obvious proposal,
I have given it a name: INT, for International Nominal Targeting.
Let me begin by noting that one cannot know what kind of
coordination is desirable without first knowing the nature of the
"externality" that is thought to characterize the noncooperative
1 There is no question that the G-7 meetings have produced specific sets of (secret)
numbers for their list of indicators. The question is whether they are forecasts/goals that
each member government sets independently, or whether a genuine element of bargain-
ing goes into them. The fact that the numbers are not made public, and indeed that their
secrecy is carefully guarded~ suggests the possibility that there may be little genuine policy
coordination going on, but that the members find it politically useful to hold meetings
nevertheless; the communiques are sufficiently vague that each member can interpret
them to his own advantage. If the meetings were to be true exercises in cooperative
policy-setting, the targets should be announced so as to enlist public expectations on the
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("Nash") equilibrium. The INT proposal presupposes that the motiva-
tion for coordination in a given year is that the noncooperative equilib-
rium is either overly contractionary because of a proclivity toward
"beggar thy neighbor" policies--suggesting a need for joint expansion,
as under the "locomotive theory"--or overly inflationary--suggesting a
need for joint discipline, as in the logic that apparently underlies the
European Monetary System. The proposal is not designed to address
externalities regarding the mix between monetary and fiscal policies, the
level of real interest rates, or exchange rates.2
In my major paper for this conference, I address one proposal
aimed at reducing excessive exchange rate variability, the "Tobin tax"
on foreign exchange transactions. In my view, a more promising route
if one wishes to try to stabilize exchange rates would be a supranational
bank, sometimes called a "Hosomi Fund," which could intervene in the
foreign exchange markets, without national central banks surrendering
their own rights to operate in the markets. In each case--International
Nominal Targeting and the Hosomi Fund~a key element of the pro-
posal as I see it is that it could begin on a very small scale so that the
members would at first be sacrificing very little policymaking sover-
eignty, could then build up trust and confidence in the institution
slowly, and might thus progress to higher degrees of commitment and
coordination if they so desired. I spell out both proposals at somewhat
greater length in a paper for an NBER/IMF conference on international
policy coordination.3
The argument for nominal GNP targeting in a closed-economy
context has been made well by others. Nominal GNP targeting has the
advantage that all nominal anchors do: by pre-committing to a rate of
growth for some nominal magnitude, monetary authorities can reduce
inflationary expectations and thus, in long-run equilibrium, attain a
lower level of inflation for a given level of real output. But nominal GNP
dominates the other nominal anchors that have been proposed. It is
clear by now that following the monetarist prescription of setting rigid
2 In particular, the proposal is not designed to address the major macroeconomic
disequilibrium of the 1980s: the U.S. structural budget deficit and consequent trade deficit.
I continue to believe that these deficits represent a unilateral failure of U.S. policymaking,
rather than an international "coordination failure." Neither the INT nor any other
proposals for coordination should be allowed to distract attention from the need for a U.S.
fiscal correction in 1989, which exists independently of any arguments for German or
Japanese expansion. Results in Frankel and Rockett (1988) show that the potential gains
from international coordination are generally less than the gains from the United States
discovering that it has been using the wrong model, and unilaterally adjusting its policies
accordingly.
a See Frankel (1989). The paper also gives references to relevant work by others, such
as the Miller-Williamson "blueprint." Ten proposals for world monetary reform are
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targets for M1 would have been disastrous in the 1980s, because of large
velocity shifts: the 1981-82 U.So recession would have lasted another
five years. Choosing the price of gold or the price of foreign exchange as
the nominal anchor has analogous problems. In each case, large shifts
occur in the behavioral relationships that tie the nominal magnitude in
question to the economic variables that we ultimately care about, such as
real output and inflation. Committing to any one of the three--money,
the price of gold, or the exchange rate--as the nominal anchor would
mean allowing these shifts to be transferred into undesirable changes in
output and inflation. As a further consequence, strong political de-
mands would inevitably arise for government policy to offset, for
example, a large recession that resulted needlessly from such a shift,
which means that the commitment would not be very credible from the
beginning.
In my view, the argument for choosing nominal GNP as the target
variable is even stronger in the context of international coordination
than in domestic policymaking. The reason is that such an approach is
the one most likely to be able to overcome the daunting obstacles to
successful coordination that a number of economists have begun to
point out in the last few years. Those obstacles are of three sorts:
uncertainty, enforcement, and time-consistent inflation-fighting credi-
bility.
Uncertainty is itself of three kinds: uncertainty regarding the
current and future position of the economy (the "baseline"), uncertainty
regarding the desirable goals (such as full employment), and uncertainty
regarding the effects on the target variables of changes in those policy
instruments that the policymakers directly control ("model uncer-
tainty"). Uncertainty regarding transmission of monetary policy inter-
nationally is much worse than domestically: whereas we generally agree
at least on the sign of a monetary expansion’s effect on domestic output
and inflation, the leading econometric models disagree completely on
the sign of the effects in the international case. So Germany could
respond to U.S. requests for faster money growth (on the theory that
faster growth in German income will result in more imports from the
United States), and yet the U.S. trade balance and output might
subsequently fall rather than rise (in response to a depreciation of the
mark against the dollar). I have shown (Frankel and Rockett 1988) that
in the presence of such uncertainties, policy coordination as usually
thought of where policymakers bargain over money supplies and fiscal
policies--can turn out to reduce economic welfare as easily as to raise it.
Enforcement of a coordination agreement can be difficult in the best
of circumstances, but it is greatly complicated by the existence of
uncertainty. In some years, some countries will lose by the agreement,
for example because their economies turn out to be operating at a higher
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entered into the agreement, so that more (or less) stimulus coming from
trading partners now turns out to be bad rather than good. In such
years, the temptation to abrogate the agreement will be especially
strong.
Cooperative setting of nominal GNP (or demand) targets on a
year-by-year basis provides the best chance of overcoming these two
obstacles to coordination, because it combines the necessary character-
istics of a coordination plan that I mentioned at the outset. Nominal
GNP constitutes a specific "performance criterion" closely enough
related to the Policy instruments that national monetary authorities
control directly, that they can be held loosely accountable for it. At the
same time, nominal GNP is closely enough related to the ultimate goals,
output alad the price level, that the desirability of having achieved the
target will not be negated by velocity shifts or other uncertainties.
Cooperative setting of nominal GNP targets on a longer-term basis
also provides the best chance of overcoming the third obstacle to
successful coordination. This is the problem pointed out by Ken Rogoff
(1985): if governments set up the machinery for joint policy-setting
period by period, it will likely turn out to entail expansion to reduce
unemployment, and thereby in the long run will undermine the
governments’ inflation-fighting credibility. The need for time-consistent
inflation-fighting credibility points to some commitment on a global
scale to a nominal anchor; just as on a national scale, nominal GNP
seems the best choice to be that nominal anchor.
My specific proposal is as follows. At each G-7 meeting, the national
authorities would (a) commit themselves, without any obsessive degree
of firmness, to target rates of growth, or ranges, for their countries’
levels of nominal demand for five years into the future, and (b) commit
themselves, with somewhat greater firmness, to targets for the coming
year.4 In the first stage, that is, the early 1990s, there would be no
explicit enforcement mechanism. But the targets would be publicly
announced, and if a country’s rate of growth of nominal demand turned
out to err significantly in one direction or the other, the fact would be
noted disapprovingly at the next G-7 meeting. This cannot happen
under the current system. Aside from the fact that the targets for the
current 11 indicators are secret, can one imagine the G-7 admonishing a
member because his country’s real growth rate turned out to be higher
4 There is a reason for choosing nominal demand (defined as GNP minus the balance
on goods and services) as the target variable in place of nominal GNP, even though the
latter is a more familiar concept. In the event of a recession, countries need to be
discouraged from the temptation to accomplish their expansion of output through net
foreign demand for example, through protectionist trade measures--as opposed to
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than targeted? (or because its inflation rate turned out to be lower than
targeted?)
I would prefer to leave to each country the specific means of
attaining the nominal demand target to which it has committed itself.
But perhaps a proposal for reform is obligated to be specific. In that case,
my favored instrument would be monetary policy. One could follow~
Bennett McCallum (1988), who has suggested a specific monetary
feedback rule in a closed-economy context: for each 1 percent that
nominal GNP deviates from its target in a given quarter, the monetary
base is expanded an additional 0.25 percent over the subsequent
quarter. He suggests setting a trend growth rate in the target of 3
percent per year, and subtracting from this the average growth rate of
base velocity over the preceding four years. I would accept the 3 percent
trend as a target average at the five-year horizon. But the international
cooperative policy-setting process would involve somewhat higher
targets in some years or for some countries, and somewhat lower targets
in other years or for other countries (without being allowed to degen-
erate into unprincipled "fine-tuning"). To constrain the target to 3
percent for all countries right from the start would doom the proposal to
the same sort of political irrelevance as a return to the gold standard and
all the other impractical proposals for world monetary reform that one
hears.
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